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special report
Swallows as It Might Have Been:
Regulations Revising Case Law
By Steve R. Johnson
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand Professor at
the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. The author invites comments
addressed to steve.johnson@unlv.edu. The author
thanks Matthew Engle and Annette Mann for their
assistance.
In Swallows Holding, the Tax Court invalidated an
interpretive regulation involving return filing by some
foreign corporations. In a previous report, Johnson
maintained that the regulation is consistent with prior
case law and should be upheld under the National
Muffler standard of deference. Therefore, Sruallou1s
should be reversed on appeal.

•

In this report, Johnson uses Szuallorvs to explore
Chevron and Brand X issues as to interpretive tax
regulations generally. He maintains that ~hePron typically should apply to challenges to those regulations
(and specifically should apply to the challenge to the
Swallows regulation) and Brand X should apply when
tax regulat~ons revise prior case law rules.
For the author's first report on Srvallou s Holding, see
"SzPallozvs Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National
Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351.
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This is the second of two reports on the Swallozvs
Holding decision. 1 In that case, the Tax Court, over three
dissenting opinions, invalidated a timing rule contained
in a Treasury regulation under IRC section 882. That
timing rule provided that some foreign corporations
could not claim otherwise available deductions if their
returns for the tax year were filed outside an 18-month
grace period. The majority and the dissenters clashed
over which line of authority - Chevron 2 or the preChevron tax-specific line of decisions typified by National
Muffier3 - provides the governing standard for evaluating the validity of general authority tax regulations, and
what result should be reached in the case under the
governing standard.
The majority opinion in Swallows identified the National Muffler line of cases as controlling. The majority
saw the regulation as contrary to prior cases, which the
majority thought had rejected that the statute authorizes
a timing limitation.-± Thus, the regulation' did not pass
muster under National Muffler and also would not have
passed muster under Chevron had Chevron provided the
controlling standard.
I believe that Swallows was wrongly decided and
should be reversed on appeal. 5 My first report6 advanced
the more modest case for reversal. The Szvallozus majority
opinion misread the cases on which it relied. Properly
analyzed, those cases establish, rather than reject the
proposition, that a timing limitation is contemplated by
the statute,' and they do not fix the point at which the
limitation is triggered. 8 That being so, the only question
is line-drawing. Treasury, not the courts, is the body

1
Swallozus Holding, Ltd. v. Co1nn11'ssioner, 126 T.C. 96, Doc
2006-1541, 2006 TNT 18-10 (2006).
2
C!1evron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
3
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472

(1979).

'See 126 T.C. at 137 and 148.
5
The IRS filed its notice of appeal to the Third Circuit on July
5, 2006.
11
Steve R. Johnson, "SzualloH 1s Holding as It Ts: The Distortion
of "tjational Muffler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351.
'See id. Part II.
'Id. Part III.A.
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authorized to fill in statutory gaps, 9 and the line drawn
by the regulation is reasonable.HJ The lesson suggested in
the first report is that the Swallows majority distorted the
standard it purported to apply. National Muffler and the
line of cases of which it is a part are deferential. In the
hands of the Swallows majority, deference was improperly
converted into strict scrutiny. 11
If I am right in the above conclusions, Swallows could
be reversed on fairly straightforward grounds without
having to grapple with larger issues arising from Chevron
and from the Supreme Court's Brand X decision last
year. 12 In Brand X, the Supreme Court held: "A court's
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only
if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion."13
In light of those cases, there are tvvo larger issues. First,
should Chevron, not National Muffler, provide the controlling standard in Swallows? Second, does Brand X authorize the Treasury to, in effect, overrule prior case law via
a general authority regulation? Those issues deserve
examination, and if there had been a conflict in Suiallows
between the regulation and the earlier cases, .Swallows
would have been a good vehicle for that examination.
Accordingly, in this report I assume a condition contrary
to fact: that there is a genuine conflict between the
regulation and the previous cases. I will sometimes refer
to "mutated ,Swallouis," to make clear that I am talking
about the case as it might have been, not as it was.
I believe that, on Chevron and Brand X grounds, the
regulation at issue in Swallows is valid, even in the
mutated scenario. Parts I and II of this article provide the
foundation. Part I sketches Swallozos, emphasizing aspects relevant to the second report. Part II analyzes the
prior cases on which the Swallows majority relied. It
shows why those cases endorsed some timing limitation,
and it assumes arguendo that they established a rule that
the terminal date (the date after which the foreign
corporation is barred from filing a return claiming otherwise allowable deductions) is the date on which the IRS
prepares a substitute for return (SFR) for the year. That
assumption would put the 18-month timing rule in the
regulation in conflict with the timing rule emanating
from the prior cases.
Part III considers the practical question: Does the
choice of governing standard - Chevron or National
Muffler - really matter? Will that choice change the
outcome in an appreciable number of actual cases? My
answer is that although the choice often will not matter,
it can matter in situations like mutated Swallows in which
a regulation contradicts prior case law.
Parts IV and V address whether Chevron should apply
to Swallows. I conclude that it should. First, as argued in

9

Id. Part IIl.B.

10

Jd. Part IV
Id. Part V.
2
i National Cable & Teleco1111n. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serus.,
125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
13
125 S. Ct. at 2700.
11
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Part IV,. general authority regulations - at least ones like
the regulation at issue in Swallou1s - should be eligible
for Chevron treatment. Second, as argued in Part V, the
Swallows regulation should receive deference since that
regulation passes scrutiny under both steps of Chevron's
two-step analysis. The regulation passes step one of
Chevron because section 882(c)(2) does not unambiguously preclude the 18-month timing rule. The purpose of
the statute - to encourage the filing of returns - is
furthered by a timing limitation. Indeed, the absence of a
timing rule would lead to absurd results. The regulation
passes step tvvo of Chevron because fixing the cutoff date
at 18 months is within the range of reason.

•

Part VI makes the case that, under Brand X, any
conflict between the regulation and the supposed prior
judicial rule should be resolved in favor of the regulation.
The precondition of Brand X - that the administrative
construction is Otherwise entitled to Chevron deference is satisfied for the reasons set out in Parts IV and V. Also,
the prior cases did not say - and could not have said that their supposed "time of SFR" construction "follows
from the unambiguous terms of [section 882(c)(2)] and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion." The grounds
on which the Swallows majority sought to distinguish
Brand X are misplaced. Indeed, the purported distinctions contort Chevron and Brand X into other, lesser
approaches to deference.
I. Swallows

A. Facts
The taxpayer was a foreign corporation that owned
real property in the United States. The corporation was
on a fiscal year ending on May 31. The tax years at issue
were 1994 to 1996. The due dates for those returns were
November 15 of 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively. 14 The
corporation did not file those returns until July 23, 1999.
The corporation was treated as having elected to treat its
U.S.-source income as effectively connected with a U.S.
trade or business. 15 The corporation's deductions for tr,e
years at issue substantially exceeded its income. The IRS
disallowed the claimed deductions and asserted deficiencies.

•

Section 882(c)(2) provides that a foreign corporation
with effectively connected income can claim deductions
"only by filing ... a true and accurate return, in the
manner prescribed in subtitle F, including therein all the
information which the [IRS] may deem necessary for the
calculation of such deductions." That requirement entered the law in 1928 and has been reenacted many times

14
Usually, a corporation must file its income tax return by the
15th day of the third month after the close of its tax year. Section
6072(b ); reg. section 1.6072-(a). However, foreign corporations
without an office or place of business in the United States (such
as the Szvallows taxpayer) may file up to the 15th day of the sixth
month after the close of the year. Section 6072(c); reg. section
1.6072-2(b ).
15
126 TC. at 97; see section 882(d)(l).
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without essential change. 16 Subtitle F contains the procedural sections of the code, including section 6072, that
prescribe when income tax returns are to be filed.
Nearly 30 years after enactment of the original predecessor of section 882, regulations were promulgated in
1957. The regulations were amended in 1990 and again in
2002 and 2003.17 The timing rule at issue in Swallows
emanated from the 1990 amendments. Those amendments were first proposed in July 19S918 and were
finalized in December 1990, effective for tax years ending
after July 31, 1990. 19 Before being finalized, the amendments went through the familiar notice-and-comment
process. 20 Treasury stated, "These regulations are necessary so that the income tax returns Iof foreign corporations and nonresident alien individuals J will be filed in a
timely manner." 21
The 1990 amendments set out timing rules for foreign
corporations in reg. section l.SS2-4 and broadly similar
timing rules for nonresident alien individuals in reg.
section 1.874-1. Under the amended regulation, a foreign
corporation may avail itself of otherwise allowable deductions and credits for the year only if it files its federal
income tax return by a specified time.2 2

•

The rules defining the terminal date include complexities and special rules unnecessary to explore for mutated
Swallows purposes. 23 In general, and as applicable to the
Swallows taxpayer, for the corporation to be allowed
deductions, "the required return for the current taxable
year must be filed within IS months of the due date as set
forth in section 6072 and the regulations, under that
section, for filing the return for the current taxable
year. " 2-1 For simplicity, I use the 18-month terminal date
throughout this report. It was the failure of the Swallows
taxpayer to file its 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns within the
IS-month period that prompted the IRS to disallow the
deductions claimed for those years.
The taxpayer challenged the validity of the regulation.
The majority opinion, invalidating the IS-month time
limit in the regulation, was authored by judge Laro, with
12 judges joining in the opinion and two judges concurring in the result only. judges Swift, Halpern, and
Holmes wrote dissenting opinions.

16

The statutory history is recounted at 126 T.C. at 107-111.
Id. at 125-129.
18
54 Fed. Reg. 31545 (July 31, 1989).
"T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 55 Fed. Reg. 50827-01 (Dec. 11,
1990), corrected at 56 Fed. Reg. 1361-01 (Jan. 14, 1991) and 56 Fed.
Reg. 5455-07 (Feb. 11, 1991).
20
See proc. reg. section 601.601; IRM 30(15) and 32.1.5.
17

21

T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172.
"Reg. section l.882-4(a)(2).

•

23
For full statement of the rules, see reg. section l.882-4(a)(3);
, see also 126 T.C. at 135 n.17 (majority opinion) and 151-53 (Swift,
)., dissenting).
2
-1Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(i). The 1990 regulation allows the
IRS to waive the 18-month requirement for good cause, based
on the facts and circumstances, if shown by the foreign corporation. Reg. section 1.882-4(a)(3)(ii). It does not appear that the·
Szvallozus taxpayer sought that waiver.
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B. Majority Opinion
Since the regulation in question was promulgated
under the general authority of section 7S05(a), not under
specific authority within section SS2 itself, the regulation
is an interpretive regulation. The Swallows majority identified National Muffler as the standard by which to assess
the validity of interpretive tax regulations. 25 In general, a
regulation is valid under that standard if it implements
Congress's intention in a reasonable manner - that is, if
it "harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
origin, and its purpose." 26 The majority concluded that
the regulation failed under that standard. The majority
suggested that it would have reached the same result
under Chevron:
We have previously stated ... "we are inclined to
the view that the traditional, i.e., National Muffler
standard, has not been changed by Chevron, but has
merely been restated in a practical two-part test
with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of
legislative history and the degree of deference to be
accorded to a regulation." ... Here, we conclude
likewise that we need not parse the semantics of the
two tests to discern any substantive difference
between them. While we apply a Natl. Muffler
analysis, our result under a Chevron analysis would
be the same. 27
The majority did not explain that "same result" conclusion. Presumably, it rests on the majority's "plain
meaning" argument. The majority stated: "A plain reading of the relevant text [of section S82(c)(2)] in the context
of the ... Code shows that the text includes no timely
filing requirement. " 28 The statute makes filing a return
"in the manner prescribed by Subtitle F" a condition for
allowance of deductions. However, the majo:l:-ity held that
the "plain meaning of the word 'manner,' as used in the
relevant text, does not include an element of time. " 29
Thus, when the regulation added a timing rule for
returns, it impermissibly went beyond the statute.
The majority noted many code and precode sections
using both "manner" and "time." 30 It concluded that
"Congress acted intentionally and purposefully when it
included both 'time' and 'manner' in single sections of
the referenced statutes but omitted the word 'time' in
favor of only the word 'manner' in other single sections
of those statutes."31 Section S82(c)(2) uses the word
"manner" but omits the word "time." Thus, the majority
concluded, Congress intended that availability of deductions depends on the foreign corporation's filing a return

25
126 T.C. at 129-131. The majority added, however, that the
result it reached would have been the same had it applied
Chevron instead of National Muffler. Id. at 131.
26

440 U.S. at 476-477.
126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Connnissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392, Doc 95~3474. 95 TNT 63-11 (1995)).
28
ld. at 132.
27

29Id.
30

See id. at 132-135.
31 Id. at 134.
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in the manner prescribed under subtitle F but does not
depend on its filing a return when prescribed under
subtitle F.
Central to the majority's plain meaning argument
were the prior cases involving section 882(c)(2), substantially similar section 874(a), 32 and their predecessors. The
line included nine cases from 1939 to 1996 decided by the
Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), the Tax Court, and the
Fourth Circuit The Swallows majority believed the regulation to be inconsistent with those cases. According to
the majority, those cases "repeatedly and consistently
held that the relevant text did not include a timely filing
requirement. "33 As a result, the regulation "merely readopted [the IRS's] unsuccessful litigating position." 34 As
described in Part II below, I believe that the majority
misread those cases.
Finally, the majority attempted to defuse Brand X.
Initially, the majority observed: "Given that the Supreme
Court has historically reviewed Federal tax regulations
primarily under the reasonableness test of Natl. Muffler . .. , the question arises whether [Brand X], which
neither cited Natl. Muffler nor involved a Federal tax
regulation, applies to Federal tax regulations." 35 In light
of its other points, the majority deemed it unnecessary to
decide that question.36
The majority's principal point was identifying "significant contrasts" between the two cases, which made
Brand X distinguishable from Swallows "for numerous
reasons." 37 1 First, in Brand X, the agency (the Federal
Communications Commission) "had carefully considered technological developments and its own related
interpretations." The majority could find "no corresponding record of the [Treasury's] consideration of
whether the relevant text in 1990 included a timely filing
requirement; the Secretary's rationale for adopting the
disputed regulations is at best perfunctory."38
Second, in Brand X, the FCC had not previously ruled
on the relevant question, but its ruling "was consistent
with prior FCC rulings." In contrast, the 1990 regulation
adopted a rule not present in the 1957 regulation and
"reverse[d] long-settled law."'''
Third, the FCC had not been a party in the prior case'°
whose holding the later FCC interpretation contravened.
"Here, the Commissioner was the unsuccessful party in

32
In relevant respects, the section 874 rules as to nonresident
alien individuals parallel the section 884 rules as to foreign
corporations, including conditioning deductions on properly
filed returns. Accordingly, the tvvo sections are viewed as in pari
materia. E.g., id. at 112; Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, 153,

Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT 188-4 (1996).
33

126 T.C. at 137.
Id. The Srvallows majority stated that the IRS
"acknowledge{d] that [its position in Szvallows] is the same as
that rejected in [the earlier cases]." Id. at 99. The details of the
pui:gorted concession and the necessity of it are not apparent.
Id. at 143-144.
36
Id. at 144.
34

37Jd.

3sld.
39Id.
'°AT&T Corp. v. Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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all of the [prior] cases.
In addition, unlike the FCC,
the Secretary, through the disputed regulations, is attempting to overturn the outco1ne of those cases through
his general regulatory authority." 41
Fourth, in Brand X, the contrary judicial interpretation
had preceded the FCC's determination by only five years.
In contrast, the first of the cases relied on by the Su1alloivs.
majority preceded the 1990 regulation by over 50 years
during which time, the majority thought, its holding had
been sanctified by repeated congressional reenactment of
the statute without essential change. 42
Finally, the Swallows majority suggested that the 1990
regulation would be invalid even if Brand X could not be
distinguished. As quoted above, under Brand X, the
regulatory interpretation yields to a judicial interpretation when the court says the statute is unambiguous. The
Swallozvs majority acknovvledged that the prior cases "did
not state explicitly that they were applying the unambiguous meaning of the word 'manner.'" Nonetheless,
the majority said, "we believe that they did so."·B

•

C. Dissenting Opinions

,
Five points offered in the dissents are relevant to this
report. First, Judges Halpern and Holmes concluded that
Chevron, not National Muffler, should provide the controlling standard and that the 1990 regulation is valid under

Chevron. 44
Second, the same judges agreed that Congress has not
spoken directly to the question at hand - that the statute
does not unambiguously preclude the timing rule set out
in the regulation.'-° Judge Holmes responded to the
majority's "manner" versus "time" analysis. He offered
two examples in the tax law in which the statutory term
"manner" has been interpreted to include a time aspect ..J. 6
Moreover, arguing that we should "recognize that even
tax statutes are written against a background of common
law legal usage," Judge Holmes stated, "It is generally
the case that when a legal instrument omits explicit time
limits to do something permitted or required, it does not
ordinarily mean that there are no time limits at all." 47
Third, the dissenters thought that the timing limitation
in the regulation is reasonable. Judge Swift opined:

•

It would seem obvious that the increased number
of foreign corporation Federal income tax returns
filed with [the IRS] in today's world (as distinguished from the 1930s when the cases relied on by
the majority were decided) and the increasingly

41

126 T.C. at 144-145.
Id. at 145. The "legislative reenactment" argument is rebutted by Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.A.
43
126 T.C. at 145.
"Id. at 157-162 (Judge Halpern) and 172-182 (judge Holmes).
"Id. at 158-160 (judge Halpern) and 164-168 (Judge Holmes).
46
Id. at 165-166 (citing reg. section 1.179-5(a) implementing
section 179(c) and reg. section 1.826-l(c) implementing section
835(c)(2)).
47
126 T.C. at 165-166 (citing contract law cases and commentary). But see Estate of Camara v. Comn1issioner, 91 T.C. 957,
960-963 (1986) (holding that a Form 872-A unlimited consent to
extend the assessment statute of limitations does not expire after
the passage of a "reasonable" period of time).
42
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complex tax laws and tax administration applicable
thereto would support, per se, [the IRS's] effort, by
properly promulgated regulation, to modify and
clarify, in the above modest manner, the return
filing deadline that has been applicable to foreign
corporations. 48
Judge Holmes agreed that the 1990 regulation is
reasonable. He reasoned thusly:
The Secretary faced an ambiguous phrase in a Code
section unambiguously aimed at giving foreign
corporations a major incentive to file their returns.
He also learned by experience that some taxpayers
would wait to file until a notice of deficiency was
issued ... or would file only after starting a case in
this Court ... or would refuse to file even after a
revenue agent came calling. . . . To issue a regulation with a fixed grace period and provision for
exceptions reflected experience, failed to consider
no aspect of the problem, and ran counter to no
reasonable evidence before hirn. 49

•

Fourth, all three dissenting judges agreed that the
majority gave too little shrift to Brand X. The grounds
offered by the majority for distinguishing the cases
"should not make a difference - [in Brand X] the
Supreme Court did not balance carefulness of consideration, prior litigation history, or the amount of time that
had passed between the case law and the new regulation.
It simply looked to see if the agency had been delegated
broad regulatory authority and whether its construction
of an ambiguous statutory phrase was reasonable."50
Fifth, all three dissenters thought that the•majority had
misread the earlier cases. They concluded that the later
cases of the line modified the earliest cases and permitted
a timing limitation. 51
II. The Prior Cases
Covering too many bases, the Swallows majority, in
various places in its opinion, seemed to read the prior
cases as standing for all of three different propositions: as
rejecting that the foreign corporation's return must be
filed by its due date in order for deductions to be
available;·as rejecting that the statute permits any timing
limitation at all; or as establishing a timing rule that is
different from the timing rule in the regulation. 52 That
fluidity led judge Halpern to describe (rather charitably)
the majority's characterization as "confusing."53

•

48
126 T.C. at 153-154. The IRS had argued essentially to the
same effect on brief. See id. at 126-127.
49
ld. at 182.
50
/d. at 171-172 (Judge Holmes); see also id. at 149 (Judge
Swift) and 162 (Judge Halpern).
51
Id. at 150-151 (judge Swift), 158-160 (Judge Halpern), and
167-168 (Judge Holmes).
52
See, e.g., id. at 137 (first proposition: "the relevant text
[does] not include a timely filing requirement"), 140 (second
proposition: "the relevant text contained no reference to a time
element"), and 137 n.22 (third proposition: the preparation of an
SFR by the IRS "divests the taxpayer of its entitlement to file a
return for itself").
53
Id. at 158.
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The first proposition has a "straw man" quality. The
1990 regulation does not set the terminal date at the due
date of the foreign corporation's return. Instead, the
regulation allows an 18-month grace period. Reading the
prior cases as rejecting a terminal date identical to the
return due date would say nothing about the validity of
the regulation. None of the prior cases tested whether an
18-month grace period would be valid.
As will be seen below, the second proposition - that
the prior cases reject any timing element whatsoever - is
impossible to sustain upon reading the cases. Indeed, all
of the courts - the BTA, the Tax Court, and the Fourth
Circuit - that decided the cases clearly held that some
timing element is contemplated by the statute.
That leaves only the third proposition: that the cases
establish a different timing rule from that in the regulation. As will be seen below, that proposition is not well
founded. However, since that proposition is less wrong
than the hopeless second proposition, I will assume the
third proposition to be a valid reading of the prior cases
to pursue the mutated Swallows analysis in Parts III
through VI of this report. Specifically, I will assume that
the prior cases established a rule that the terminal date
for section 882(c)(2) purposes is the date the IRS prepares
an SFR for the tax year.
A. The 'No Timing Rule' View
We will now review the prior cases to the degree
necessary to show that they cannot stand for the proposition that the statute does not permit any timing limitation.54 The Swallows majority's best support is the BTA's
1938 Anglo-A1nerican decision55 although even that case
has some ambiguity. The IRS' s position appears to have
been that returns filed even one day after their prescribed
due dates preclude claiming deductions.s6 1The BTA rejected that position in a reviewed decision without dissent. The board acknowledged that the word "manner"
is linguistically ambiguous.
It is true, as [the IRS] points out, that "manner" is a
comprehensive term, and includes, but is more
comprehensive than, "method, mode, or way." But
whether it is broad enough to include the element
of time is a more difficult question. In some instances it has been construed by courts as including
time; while in others it has been construed as not
including it. 57

Nonetheless, the BTA thought that the term was clear
(and did not include a time element) as it is used in the
tax statutes. 58 However, the BTA did not frame its holding in absolute terms. "We hold ... that the mere fact that
the return was not filed within the time prescribed by

54

For a more detailed discussion of the cases, see Johnson,
,

supra note 6, Part II.
55

Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner,

38 BTA 711 (1938). The IRS issued a nonacquiescence to AngloAmerican. 1939-1 CB. (pt. 1) 39 .
56
See 38 BTA at 713-714.
57
Id. at 714 (numerous cited cases omitted).
58
Id. at 715 .
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[what is now section 6072] does not, under the circumstances of this case, preclude the allowance of the deductions claimed." 59 Thus, the BTA did not necessarily reject
all possible terminal dates, just a terminal date identical
to the return due date, and even that only under the
circumstances of the particular Case, which may not be
the circumstances of other cases. Anglo-American was
quickly followed by two BIA memorandum decisions
that adhered to Angla-American without additional analysis.60
However, the line of cases was soon to take a different
direction. Slightly over a year after Angla-American, the
BTA decided Taylor Secu11'ties. 61 In a reviewed decision
over three dissents, the BIA distinguished AnglaAmerican62 and held for the IRS. The Taylar Securities BIA
held that the statute contemplates some time cutoff after
which deductions may not be claimed. Under the statute:
the allowance to foreign corporations of the credits
and deductions ordinarily allowable is specifically
predicated upon such corporations filing returns. In
view of such a specific prerequisite it is inconceivable that Congress contemplated by that section
that taxpayers could wait indefinitely to file returns
and eventually when the [IRS] determined deficiencies against them that they could then by filing
returns obtain all the benefits to which they would
have been entitled if their returns had been timely
filed. Such a construction would put a premium on
evasion,+ since a taxpayer would have nothing to
lose by not filing a return as required by the
statute. 63
All of the subsequent cases confirmed Taylor Securities
in that respect: The statute contemplates a timing requirement. Both the BIA and the Fourth Circuit accepted that
principle in Ardbern.64
In Blenheim, the BIA held for the IRS, stating that a
taxpayer cannot "take advantage from an alleged return
submitted not only after the [IRS prepared an SFR] but
also after the issuance of a notice of deficiency. "65 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that a timing rule is
essential to sound tax administration.

39

/d.
Mills, Spence & Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1938 WL 8403 (BTA
memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust Co., Ltd. v. Con11nissioner,
60

The many administrative problems inherent in the
application of the federal income tax to foreign
corporations ... prompted Congress to impose special conditions on such corporations.
In express
recognition of this fertile danger to the orderly
. administration of the income tax as applied to
foreign corporations, Congress conditioned its
grant of deductions upon the timely filing of true,
proper and complete returns.66

•

Gearday was a companion case to Blenheim. The BIA
and the Fourth Circuit hewed to the same approach as
they had in Blenheim, and both held for the IRS. 67
Espinosa 68 arose under section 874(a). Again invoking the
administrative imperative, the Tax Court held for the IRS,
stating that a timing limitation is implicit in the statute. 69
The final case, InverWarld, was a section 882(c)(2) decision. The Tax Court held for the IRS on the strength of
Georday and Blenhei1n.7o
That the IRS prevailed on the essential point in six of
the nine prior cases makes the Swallows majority's repeated reference to a "failed" or "unsuccessful" IRS
litigating position seem strange. More fundamentally, the
foregoing demonstrates that the prior cases cannot reasonably be read to stand for the proposition that section
882(c)(2) permits no timing limitation whatsoever. Even
Anglo-A1nerican did not unambiguously assert that
proposition, and the subsequent cases plainly rejected it.
B. The 'Different Timing Rule' View ·
The only remaining possibility for a conflict between
the 1990 regulation and the prior cases is the proposition
that the cases established a timing rule, one different
from the 18-month period under the regulation. In actuality, that proposition is wrong. The prior decisions did
not "provide guidance of general applicability concerning timeliness: [they] merely resolve[d] issues created by
unique fact patterns on a case-by-case basis. . . Timeliness is required, but timeliness is not defined. " 71 The
Blenhei1n circuit court said that it was not "prescribing an
absolute and rigid rule" regarding the terminal date or
event,72 and that is true of the other cases as well.

•

Possible terminal dates arguably suggested in the
cases include a reasonable time after the date on which
the IRS contacted the taxpayer about the missing return(s),73 the date an IRS agent prepared an SFR,74 the

1939 WL 12044 (BTA memo. 1939).
61

Taylor Sec. Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 BTA 696 (1939).
Unlike the situation in Taylor Securities, the returns in
Anglo-American had been filed before the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency, the IRS audited the Anglo-American returns, and the
SFRs prepared in Anglo-American had not been accepted by the
commissioner. Id. at 702-703.
62

63

/d. at 703-704.

6

..1Ardbern Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 41 BTA 910, 920 (1940),
1nodified and remanded on other grounds, 120 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir.
1941). The circuit court's modification was based on an equitable consideration (the taxpayer had tried to file the returns
earlier with the \.Vrong IRS office, and the IRS failed to tell the
taxpayer where it should have filed) that is not present in

Szuallozvs.
65
Blenheint Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 BTA 1248, 1251 (1940),
alfd, 125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942).
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66

125 F.2d at 909 (emphasis added).

67

Georday Enter., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1940 WL 10265 (BTA
memo. 1940), affd, 126 F.2d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1942).
68
Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT
188-4 (1996).
69
107 T.C. at 156-157.
70
InverWorld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-301, Doc 9618802, 96 TNT 127-14, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, 3237-3256.
1
'. 126 T.C. at 160 (Halpern,)., dissenting).
2
' 125 F.2d at 910.
73
Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157.
74
E.g., Blenheim, 42 BTA at 1251and125 F.2d at 910. The SFRs
that occur in that context are those described in section 6020(b ).
They are prepared by the IRS from available information, but
unlike section 6020(a) SFRs, are not signed by the taxpayer.
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date the SFR was formally accepted or acted upon/ 5 the
date the IRS sent the taxpayer a "doomsday letter," 76 the
date the IRS issued the notice of deficiency, 77 the dates
pleadings were filed in court,78 the date the case was
tried,79 and the date the IRS made the assessment.so In
short, the prior cases did not establish a rule.
Nonetheless, the Swallows majority, in one part of its
opinion, read the prior cases as standing for a "preparation of an SFR" terminal date. 81 Accordingly, to explore
Chevron and Brand X issues via mutated Swallows, I will
assume throughout the rest of this report that the prior
cases stand for that rule.
III. Significance of Choice of Standard
I believe National Muffler and Chevron should be seen
as cases of the same line, not as two separate and
competing standards of deference. I will develop this
thought in a future article. The current report, however,
accepts arguendo the usual view that the cases represent
two separate standards. On that premise, this section
describes Chevron and the tax-specific line of cases of
which National Muffler is a part. It then evaluates the
potential effect on the outcomes of actual cases of the
choice of governing standard, particularly in situations of
conflict between regulations and prior case law.

A. Chevron

•

This ground is well trodden, so it can be covered
quickly. In Chevron, the Supreme Court reversed a circuit
court decision invalidating a regulation promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency. The Court framed
the proper role of a reviewing court in the now famous
two-step analysis:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
deter!1lines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 82

75

76

•

Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 702.
Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 151. Such a letter informs the taxpayer

that, because of the delinquency of the return, the taxpayer may
not claim otherwise available deductions for the year.
77
E.g., Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703.
.
78
Georday, 126 F.2d at 388; Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 702.
"InverWorld, 71 T.C.M. at 3237-3256 .
so Ardbern, 120 F.2d at 426.
81
126 T.C. at 137 n.22.
82
/d. at 842-843.

At step one in the analysis, the court exercises its
independent judgment and employs "traditional tools of
statutory construction. " 83 If step two is reached, however,
the analysis becomes more deferential.
The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even
the reading the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. . . . The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress. 84
The two-step analysis provides the framework for
cases to which Chevron applies. Chevron, however, did not
tell us to what types of agency interpretations it applies.
When that question is taken into account, the two-step
analysis becomes a three-step analysis. Since determining
whether Chevron applies at all is logically anterior to the
other steps, the additional inquiry has been called step
zero. 85
The vacuum that Chevron left with respect to step zero
was filled, although less than satisfactorily, by the subsequent Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart, and Brand X
cases. 86 Those cases are discussed in detail in Part IV.B
below. For now, it suffices to note that those cases
revivified the pre-Chevron Skidmore standard by instructing that Skidmore can apply when Chevron does not. 87
Skidmore stated:
The rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under the Act, while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 88
B. Tax-Specific Line of Cases
Notions of deference have been in the tax jurisprudence for generations. 89 A recognizably modern form of

tl3Id. at 843.
Id. (citations and punctuation marks omitted).
83
Cass R. Sunstein, "Chevron Step Zero," 92 Va. L. Rev. 187,
191 (2006).
86
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999);
Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002);
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.
Ct. 2688 (2005).
87
E.g., Mead, 533 U.S. at 221; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
88
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994).
89
E.g., Faivcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378
(1931) (tax regulations "are valid unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the statute"); cf International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257
U.S. 506, 514 (1922) (stating the following as to customs duties
84

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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deference doctrine began to appear shortly after World
War II. Between then and 1984, when Chevron \Vas
decided, more than a half dozen Supreme Court cases9 L1
and numerous lower court cases considered deference in
the tax context The Supreme Court's Nntionnl Muffler
decision - perhaps the most fre(iuently cited case of this
line and the case on which the Suiallorvs majority relied distilled the following factors from prior cases:
In determining whether a particular regulation
carries out the congressional mandate in a proper
manner, we look to see whether the regulation
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute,
its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have
particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent.
If the regulation dates from a later period, the
manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other
relevant considerations are the length of time the
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on
it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has
devoted to the regulation during subsequent reenactments of the statute.91

Many cases of this line distinguish between two types
of regulations: legislative (also called substantive) and
interpretive.9 2 Those terms can be confusing, hovvever.
They have 1different meanings in tax than in administrative law. In tax, interpretive regulations are issued under
section 7805(a)'s broad delegation to the Treasury to
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the code]" while legislative regulations are
issued under a specific delegation within the particular
code section.93 In contrast, in administrative law, an
interpretive regulation is clarifying or advisory in that it
"express[ es} an agency's intended course of action or its
view of the meaning of a statute" vvhile a legislative
regulation makes new, enforceable law, "creat[ingJ law
just as the statute itself does, by changing existing rights
and obligations." 9 .: To avoid the confusion that may arise
from those different usages, this report follows Prof.
Coverdale's suggested terminology. 95 Thus, this report

typically refers to "generai authority" regulations instead
of interpretative regulations, and to "specific authority"
regulations instead of legislative regulations.
Numerous cases have stated that general authority tax
regulations receive less deference than do specific authority regulations. 96 However, the significance of that distinction is questionable for three reasons. First, invoca-;
tions of the distinction are more often ritualistic than
outcome determinative. Attacks on general authority
regulations usually fail, and attacks on specific authority
regulations sometimes succeed.9 7 Indeed, it would be a
challenge to identify an appreciable number of actual
cases in which general authorit)r regulations were invalidated when they would likely have been upheld had
they been specific authority regulations. Even Sr:uallows is
not such a case. Oi1e of the majority's rationales was that
the regulation at issue is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the statute.98 If so, 99 the regulation would
have been invalidated even had it been a specific authority regulation. HJO
Second, even if a difference exists in practice as well as
rhetorically, that difference likely is small'"" To say
general authority regulations receive less deference than
do specific authority regulations may distract from the
fact that the former still receive a lot of deference.
Referring specifically to general authority tax regulations, the Supreme Court remarked in a frequently cited
case:
We recognize that this Court is not in the business
of administering the tax laws of this Nation. Congress has delegated that task to the Secretary of the
Treasury, 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), and regulations promulgated under his authority, if found to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner, must be upheld.1°2
Similarly, the Third Circuit has said: "In the tax area,
we are still required to treat regulations issued under a

•

If-,,
•

(1995); see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d
973, 978-979, Doc 98-12811, 98 TNT 76-8 (7th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 961, Doc 98-32323, 98 TNT 212-4 (1998).
96

E.g., Rorunn Cos., Inc. u. Connnissioner, 452 U.S. 247, 253

(1981).
97

that the Court called "virtually [the] laying [of] a tax": "A
regulation to be valid must be reasonable and must be consistent with law").
90
E.g., Co1nmissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169
(1981); Bingler v. /olmson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-751 (1969); Commis-

sioner v. South Texas Lun1ber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
91
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S.
472, 477 (1979).
92
See generally Ellen P. Aprill, "Muffled Chevron: Judicial
Review of Tax Regulations," 3 Fla. Tnx ReP. 51, 55-57 (1996);
Michael Asimow, "Public Participation in the Adoption of
Temporary Tax Regulations," 44 Tnx Lnru. 343, 350-362 (1991).
'hE.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24

(1982).
9
.+Bernard Schwartz, Administratir.ie Lazv 181 (3d ed. 1991)
(quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see Chrysler Corp. u.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-302 (1979).
95
John F. Coverdale, "Court Review of Tax Regulations and
Revenue Rulings in the Che1.1ron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L. ReP. 35, 52

E.g., Rite Aid Corp. n United States, 255 F.3d 1357, Doc

2001-18688, 2001 TNT 132-10 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v.
Co1111nissio11er, 103 T.C. 656, Doc 94-10271, 94 TNT 224-11 (1994),
rev'd, 87 F.3d 99, Doc 96-19729, 96 TNT 135-12 (3d Cir. 1996)

(legislative regulation invalidated by Tax Court but validated on
appeal).
'!t>126 T.C. at 132-136.
99
1 disagree with the majority's conclusion in this regard in
Part \T.A.
rnuA regulation (of any sort) that flouts the plain meaning of
the statute fails step one of CheLiron. See C/1evro11, 467 U.S. at 843.
It also would fail under the pre-ChePron tax-specific line of
authority.
im See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon Jr., and
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individunls 46-5
(3d ed. 2002) {noting the distinction "at least in theory; but in
practice this dichotomy is ethereal, and taxpayers rarely succeed
in uRsetting regulations of either type").
1 2
U11ited States v. Cartzuright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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general grant of authority with broad deference, although to a somewhat lesser degree than when Congress
has made a specific delegation of authority in a specific
statute." 103
Third, the two types of regulations are identical in an
important respect. The Administrative Procedure Act
prescribes notice and comment processes that agencies
are to follow to promulgate binding rules. 104 Interpretive
rules (in the nontax sense) are expressly exempted from
notice and comment requirements. 105 As shown in Part
IV.C below, whether a particular regulation has gone
through the notice and comment process is a significant
factor in determining the degree of deference it will
receive. Significantly, the two kinds of tax regulations are
essentially equal in that regard. Not only do specific
authority regulations go through the notice and comment
process, but virtually all general authority regulations go
through it as well. 106
This tax-specific line of cases has retained vigor even
after Chevron. As described in greater detail in Part IV.A
below, post-Chevron tax cases have cited, as providing the
controlling standard, Chevron alone, the National Muffler
cases, or both in ways that defy confident categorization.
National Muffler and the line of cases of which it is a part
are discussed at length in my first report on Swallozus. I
conclude that the case and the line are deferential, not
hostile, to tax regulations. 10 7
C. Effect on Actual Outcomes

•

•

The Swallows majority posed the question whether the
Supreme Court intended Chevron to replace the National
Muffl.er line of cases as the standard for €,'Valuating the
validity of tax regulations. It answered that question by
adhering to the view expressed in a previous decision
that "'the traditional, i.e., National Muffler standard, has
not been [greatly] changed by Chevron, but has merely
been restated [by it].'"JOs
I agree that there is limited profit in endlessly teasing
and torturing the verbal formulations of various standards. The spirit in which a standard is applied typically
matters more than the precise wording of the standard. A
deferential court applying National Muffler is more likely
to upho\d a rule or regulation than is an active court
applying Chevron. 10 9 Courts wishing to invalidate a rule

or regulation under Chevron often achieve that result by
finding clear at step one of the two-step analysis what
others would have found ambiguous 110 or by selectively
applying indicia of reasonableness at step two. 111
I doubt that the choice of standard matters a great deal
in most cases. 112 However, some types of cases - including mutated Szvallows - may be exceptions. The choice
between Chevron and the National Muffler line may be
outcome-significant in cases in which a general authority
tax regulation contradicts prior cases. 113
Skidnzore often produces less deference than Chevron, 114
and National Muffl.er has some structural and substantive
similarity to Skid1nore. After setting out a more general
standard, National Muffler lists six factors. 115 Skidmore too
lists factors, 11 ro and there is overlap between the two lists.
The Swallows majority found "consistency with prior case
law" to be within the scope of the National Muffler
factors, 117 and Skid1nore's catchall language 118 is broad
enough to encompass a similar inquiry.
Of course, reasonableness (Chevron's step two) also is
extremely broad in scope. 11 Thus, another consideration
C)

(describing deferential and active courts in reference to Chevron); see also Cynthia R. Farina, "Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State," 89 Colum. L. Rev.
452, 453-454 (1989) (describing the deferential model and independent judgment model of judicial behavior in interpreting
statutes also interpreted by agencies).
110
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., "The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence
in the Administrative State," 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 750 (1995).
111
See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver, and Jack M.
Beermann, Administrative Lar.v: Cases and Materials 143 (5th ed.
2006) (Step Two "has proved to be no less difficult than Step

One").

1

112

See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d
973, 981-983 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998);
David A. Brennan, "Treasury Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-Chevron Era," 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 387, 430
(1997); Noel B. Cunningham and James R. Repetti, "Textualism
and Tax Shelters," 24 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 47 (2004).
113
See 126 T.C. at 173 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
"in most cases, applying either National Muffler or Chevron will
end up producing the same result" but that "the most important
class of cases in which results under the two tests diverge is the
one into which this case falls").
11
-±"Skidmore is commonly understood to be 'weak deference."' Jim Rossi, "Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron," 42 Wm. & Man; L. Rev.
1105, 1109 (2001); see also Michael Asimow, "The Scope of
Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies," 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1194-1198 (1995); Colin S. Diver,
"Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State," 133 U.
Pa. L Rev. 549, 565 (1985) (both cited by Rossi, supra, at 1109

103
£.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130,
135, Doc 94-10819, 94 TNT 240-6 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 140-141, Doc 200323580, 2003 TNT 211-8 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813,
Doc 2004-3710, 2004 TNT 36-8 (2004); Snozva v. Commissioner, 123
F.3d 190, 197, Doc 97-24194, 97 TNT 163-8 (4th Cir. 1997) (after
classifying the regulation at issue as interpretive not legislative,
saying "the regulation is still entitled to considerable deference").
1
°'5 U.S.C. sections 553(b)-(e).
rn 5 Id. section 553(b).
106
See proc. reg. section 601.601; IRM section 30(15).
w7Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.
ws126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995)) .
w9 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, "A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 94-95 (1994)

115
440 U.S. at 477. My first article criticized the Swallor.vs
majority for letting attachment to the factors blur the deferential
spirit and general standard of National Muffler. Johnson, supra
note 6, Part V.B.
116
323 U.S. at 140, quoted supra at note 88.
117
126 T.C. at 137. 1
1
L'>323 U.S. at 140 (referring to "all those factors which give
[an a~ency's interpretation] power to persuade").
11
"The ambiguity of the term ureasonable" is such that courts
typically accord substantial deference to agency constructions of

(Footnote continued in next' column.)
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is of greater moment. As maintained in Part VI below,
Brand X significantly shifts the needle towards an agency
interpretation in cases of conflict between such an interpretation and prior case law. Brand X said that its rule
applies to "an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference.'' 120 Therefore, by choosing National
Muffler over Chevron as the governing standard, the court
reviewing a challenged regulation can, at least arguably,
avoid giving the regulation the benefit of Brand X. 121

IV. Applicability of Chevron
Jn the early years after Chevron was decided, some
questioned whether it applied at all in the tax context.1 22
By now, it is clear that Chevron applies to at least some
administrative interpretations of the code. 123 It is generally agreed, for example, that Chevron applies to specific
authority tax regulations.1 24 The Tax Court itself has so
held in numerous cases. 12s
But the regulation at issue in Swallows is a general
authority regulation. The Swallows majority questioned
whether Chevron applies to general authority regulations.126 That question is fairly asked because the cases
addressing the issue thus far have hardly spoken with
one voice.127 I summarize those cases below and then

it when the word is used in a statute. E.g., Metrophones Telecom1ns., Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 F.3d 1056, 1067

(9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006); Capital
Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
120
125 S. Ct. at 2700.

121 Another class of cases in which the choice may matter
involves administrative inconsistency. National Muffler and Skidmore seem more concerned with an agency's changing its mind
than is Chevron. Compare National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477, and
Skid1nore, 323 U.S. at 140, with Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 and 863;
see also Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.B.l (criticizing the Swallows
majority's administrative inconsistency argument).
For discussion of the related question whether the IRS can be
held to a previous position under a governmental duty of
consistency, see, e.g., Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, "Does the
Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?," 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 531 (2005);
Lawrence Zelenak, "Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be Consistent?," 40 Tax L. Rev. 411 (1985).
122
See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 95, at 53-57; Mitchell M.
Gans, "Deference and the End of Tax Practice," 36 Real Prop.
Probate & Trust J. 731, 749-750 (2002).
123
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 85, at 189.
124
See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, "Can Treasury Overrule the

Supreme Court?," 84 B.U.L. Rev. 185, 210 (2004); Edward ).
Schnee and W. Eugene Seago, "Deference Issues in the Tax Law:
Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule-Or Does It?," 96 J. Tax'n 366,
371 (2002); American Bar Association Section of Taxation Report
on Judicial Deference {hereafter "ABA Deference Report"], 57

Tax Law. 717, 737-738 (2004).
125 E.g., Carlos v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280, Doc 200418624, 2004 TNT 183-9 (2004); Estate of Clause v. Commissioner,
122 T.C. 115, 119, Doc 2004·2720, 2004 TNT 27-12 (2004); Square D
Co. v. Comn1issioner, 118 T.C. 299, 307, Doc 2002-7591, 2002 TNT
60·8 (2002), affd, 438 F.3d 739, Doc 2006-2877, 2006 TNT 30-9 (7th
Cir. 2006).
126

126 T.C. at 131.

127
See, e.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 117-118, Doc
2002-20462, 2002 TNT 173-4 (2002) (Vasquez, )., dissenting);

describe the Supreme Court's teaching as to step zero. I
then explain why I believe that the regulation at issue in

Swallows is entitled to be analyzed through the Chevron
A. Case Law
The Supreme Court has decided four post-Chevron
cases involving the validity of general authority tax
regulations: Boyle, Cottage Savings, Atlantic Mutual, and
Boeing. 128 The Court upheld the regulation in question in
all four cases. Taking the cases as a whole, however, the

Court neither clearly held nor clearly rejected that Chevron provides the standard for determining such validity.
In Boyle, the Court cited Chevron but not National Muffler.129 In Cottage Savings, the Court cited National Muffler's general language but not its six enumerated considerations, 130 and it did not cite Chevron. 131 In Atlantic
Mutual, the Court cited Chevron and Cottage Savings but
not National Muffler. 132 In Boeing, the Court cited Cottage
Savings but not Chevron or National Muffler. 133 In none of
those cases did the Court explain why it was using the
lines it was using or eschewing the lines it wasn't using.
Given the Supreme Court's failure to provide clear

guidance, it is not surprising that "the relationship between Chevron and National Muffler has long puzzled
lower courts. " 134 Judge Holmes surveyed the circuits in
his Swallows dissent. The circuits break down into three
categories. Circuits applying Chevron to general authority
tax regulations constitute the largest cluster, consisting of

six circuits. Four circuits apply the National Muffler line.
The question remains open in three circuits, 135 including

the Third Circuit, to which Swallows has been appealed.

.\

In a 1994 case, the Third Circuit said that general authority tax regulations receive less deference than specific

j'

authority regulations, but it left open the possibility that
general authority regulations may qualify for Chevron

Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 391 (1995)
("Chevron has had a checkered career in the tax arena").
128
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Cottage Sav. Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, Doc 98-12876, 98 TNT 77-8 (1998);
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, Doc 2003-5648, 2003 TNT
43.7 (2003).
129
469 U.S. at 247 n.4. But see ABA Deference Report, supra
note 124, at 761 n.112 (suggesting that Boyle only weakly
invoked Chevron).
130
See Part IILB supra.
131
499 U.S. at 560-561.
132
523 U.S. at 387 and 389; see Gans, supra note 122, at 750
(stating that Atlantic Mutual "made it clear that Chevron's
framework is applicable to interpretive regulations"); Polsky,
supra note 124, at 209 and n.139 (stating that Atlantic Mutual

"ap}il[ied] the Chevron methodology").
3
537 U.S. at 448.
134
ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at 763; see, e.g.,
General Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8, Doc
2001-9634, 2001 TNT 65-18 (2d Cir. 2001), acq. in result, 2003-49
!RB 1172; Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 787, 790, Doc 95-2224,
95 TNT 35-12 (6th Cir. 1995).
135
126 T.C. at 180-181 (citing cases); see also Bankers Life & Cas.
Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 982 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 961 (1998); ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at
763-766.

(Footnote continued in next column.)

782

.:

framework.

TAX NOTES, August 28, 2006

•

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

•

•

deference. 136 The Third Circuit has accorded Chevron
deference to nontax regulations that have gone through
the notice and comment process.137
In light of the question raised by the Swallows majority,
one might think that the Tax Court has rejected application of Chevron to general authority regulations. But once
again the picture is mixed. Sometimes the Tax Court has
tested those regulations under the National Muffler line; 138
other times it has invoked Chevron. 139 Frequently it has
referred to both.140
That checkered history in the various courts hearing
federal tax cases gives rise to two conclusions. First, to
produce that division, there must be significant considerations (or ingrained habits) on both sides of the issue.
Second, arguing, as I will, for the application of Chevron
to the regulation at issue in Swallows is not foreclosed by
a settled judicial consensus.

B. Considerations Governing Step Zero
As noted above, the key cases for Chevron step zero
analysis are Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart, and
Brand X, none of which are tax cases. In Haggar, the Court
accorded Chevron deference to a Customs Service regulation. The discursive style of the opinion makes it hard to
identify a clear step-zero test. However, the Court mentioned that the regulation was "intend[ed] to bind the
public," that it helped "to define the legal relations
between the Government and regulated entities," and
especially that the Customs Service "utilized the noticeand-comment rulemaking process before issuing the
regulations. " 141
Christensen denied Chevron entitlement to an agency
interpretation "contained in an opinion letter, not one
arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters - like interpretations contained
in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not
warrant Chevron-style deference."1-i2
Mead denied Chevron entitlement to a tariff classification contained in a letter issued by the Customs Service.
The Court said:
administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference

136

•

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Com1nissioner, 41 F.3d 130,
135-136 and n.23 (1994).
"'E.g., Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 807 (1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 870 (1999).
138
£.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 219, 234, Doc
2004-16911, 2004TNT162-7 (2004), aff d, 137 Fed. Appx. 373, Doc
2005-14477, 2005 TNT 129-7 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom.
Latos v. Commissioner, 126 S. Ct. 1595 (2006).
139
E.g., Lemishow v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 346, 346, Doc
98-17478, 98 TNT 106-11 (1998).
140
E.g., Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44, 69-70 (2002);
Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589, 597-598 (2000), acq., Notice
'.2.003-72, 2003-2 C.B. 964; Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Commissioner, 115
T.C. 1, 7-9, Doc 2000-19280, 2000 TNT 138-17 (2000); Hospiial
Corp. of Am. v. Commissioner, 107 TC. 116, 134 (1996), affd, 348
F.3d 136, 140 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813 (2004).
1
"526 U.S. at 388-389.
u 2529 U.S. at 587.
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when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority ... Delegation of such authority
may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent. 143
The classification did not go through the notice-andcomment process. "As significant as notice-and-comment
is in pointing to Chevron authority," 144 its absence was not
dispositive. The Court has "sometimes found reasons for
Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded." 145 Also
important, among other factors, were the diffuse authority for issuing those classifications and the volume of
those classifications. "Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being churned out at
a rate of 10,000 a year at the agency's 46 scattered offices
is simply self-refuting."146
Barnhart accorded Chevron entitlement to an agency
interpretation originally set out in a manual, a ruling, and
a letter. The Court said:
the fact that the Agency ... reached its interpretation through means less formal than "notice and
comment" rulemaking ... does not automatically
deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference
otherwise its due. . . . Indeed, Mead pointed to
instances in which the Court has applied Chevron
deference to agency interpretations that did not
emerge out of notice-and-comment rulemaking. . . . It indicated that whether a court should
give such deference depends in significant part
upon the interpretive method used and the nature
of the question at issue. . . . And it disc'ussed at
length why Chevron did not require deference in the
circumstances there present - a discussion that
would have been superfluous had the presence or
absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking been
dispositive. 147
The Court listed the following factors in support of
according Chevron entitlement to the agency's interpretation: the long-standing nature of the interpretation, the
respect usually accorded an agency's interpretation of its
own rules, "the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity
of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of
time."148
Most recently, step zero was revisited in Brand X
although in Justice Scalia's dissent and justice Breyer's

w533 U.S. at 226-227.
Id. at 230-231.
145
Id. at 231 (citing NatjonsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-257 (1995)) .
1 6
' 533 U.S. at 233.
147535 U.S. at 221-222.
148
Id. at 522.
144
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concurrence, not in the opinion for the Court. Justice
Scalia read Mead thusly: "Some unspecified degree of
formal process [is] required- or [is] at least the only safe
harbor." 149 He proposed instead a broader test: "Any
agency position that plainly 4as the approval of the
agency head" should be entitled to Chevron deference. 150
In Justice Breyer's view, however, Mead teaches that:
An agency action qualifies for Chevron deference
when Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated to the agency the authority to "fill" a
statutory "gap," including an interpretive gap created through an ambiguity in the language of a
statute's provisions. The Court said in Mead that
such delegation "may be shown in a variety of ways,
as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemal<lng, or by some other
indication of a comparable congressional intent. The
court explicitly stated that the absence of noticeand-comment rulemaking did "not decide the
case," for the Court has "sometimes found reasons
for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded." And the Court repeated that it "has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would
expect Chevron deference."1s1

Justice Breyer thus concluded that "the existence of a
formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for according Chevron deference to
an agency's interpretation of a stahtte." 152 Formal rulemaking "is not a necessary condition because an agency
might arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a congressional enactment in other ways, including ways that
Justice Scalia mentions." 1 5 3 However, formal rulemaking
"is not a sufficient condition because Congress may have
intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the
agency uses to arrive at that interpretation, say, where an
unusually basic legal question is at issue." 154
C. Argument
I believe that virtually all general authority tax regulations should be Chevron-entitled, a case I intend to make
in a future article. In this report, I undertake only the
narrower, easier task of maintaining that the regulation at
issue in Swallows qualifies under Chevron step zero. There
are six reasons why that regulation should be Chevronentitled. Three are common to all or nearly all general
authority tax regulations, and three are particular to this
regulation.
First, nearly all final general authority tax regulations
go through the notice and comment process. 155 As noted

49
'
150

125 S. Ct. at 2718-2719.

Id. at 2719 n.10.
151
Id. at 2712 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
1s21a.

in Part I.A, the Swallows regulation went through it. That
factor may not be dispositive, but it is close to it. As seen
in Part !V.B above, Haggar, Christensen, Mead, Barnhart,
and the Breyer concurrence, as well as the Scalia dissent
in Brand X, all adverted to that consideration as important to Chevron entitlement.
Second, general authority tax regulations receive approval at the highest relevant administrative level. They
are "prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by
the Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate." 156 That
contrasts significantly with the highly decentralized (46
separate offices) approval and issuance process for the
classification letters denied Chevron entitlement by
Mead.'57 In Justice Scalia's view, approval by the agency
head suffices to qualify an agency interpretation for
Chevron treatment,1ss
Third, whatever "force of law" means, general authority tax regul~tions probably have it. Christensen adverted
to "force of law" stahts. 159 So did Mead, 160 but in a fashion
that "squarely rejected a possible reading of Christensen:
that agency interpretations lacking force of law, or not
preceded by formal procedures, would always [fail to
receive Chevron treatment]."16 1 Barnhart - which accorded Chevron difference to an interpretation even in its
agency manual phase of development162 - made it clear
that force-of-law status is helpful but not indispensable to
Chevron qualification. 1 63
I advance a force-of-law argument with some hesitancy because no one knows for sure what the phrase
means. 164 Nonetheless, general authority tax regulations
in general and the Swallows regulation in particular likely
have the .force of law, however that concept is defined.
General authority regulations are intended to have general applicability,165 bind taxpayers and the IRS,'66 are

\.

.

f

(2004).
"'Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2719 n.10 (Scalia, )., dissenting).
9

529 U.S. at 587.
533 U.S. at 226.
161 Sunstein, supra note 85, at 214-215.
62
' 535 U.S. at 221.
163
Sunstein, supra note 85, at 216.
164
See, e.g., Richard W. Murphy, "Judicial Deference, Agency
Commitment, and Force of Law," 66 Ohfo St. L.]. 1013, 1016
(2005) (calling the concept "incoherent").
165Saltzman, supra note 155, at 3-7; see Murphy, supra note
"

'

60

164, at 1017 (force of law exists when the agency interpretation
applies uniformly across time and parties).
166
See General Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 134 (both
parties conceded that they are bound by a valid regulation);
Bittker, McMahon, and Zelenak, supra note 101, at 46-5; Mitchell

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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and Procedure paras. 3.02[1 J and [2] (rev. 2d ed. stud. ed. 2002);
Paul F. Schmid, "The Tax Regulations Making Process - Then
and Now," 24 Tax. Law. 541 (1971); Laurens Williams, "Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations," 8
USC Tax Inst. 733 (1956).
156
Proc. reg. section 601.601(a)(l); see also Bittker, McMahon,
and Zelenak, supra note 101, at 46-5.
157
533 U.S. at 232-233; see Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 144-145 (6th Cir. 2003) (according Chevron
deference to tax regulations "arrived at centrally by the Treasury
Department, after careful consideration" and contrasting those
regulations with the Mead letters), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 813

Jd. at 2713 (emphasis in original).
155
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); proc. reg. sections
601.601(a) and (b). See generally Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice

153Jd.
154

•

TAX NOTES, August 28, 2006

•

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

•

time consuming and costly to change because of the steps
required to promulgate and amend them, 16 7 and entail
sanctions for their violation. I68
There is a pre-Christensen body of cases that discusses
the phrase "force of law" in connection with tax regulations and lower-level IRS interpretations. Several decisions stated that general authority regulations have forceof-law status, either without apparent qualification 169 or
under particular circumstances, such as the regulation
being of long standing and having survived successive
statutory reenactments. 170 I intend to explore that body of
cases in detail in a future article. For now, I note the cases
but put limited reliance on them because the cases do not
speak with a single voice and because it is not clear that
Christensen, Mead, and the earlier cases had the same
thing in mind when using the phrase "force of law."
The three remaining arguments for Chevron entitlement are particular to the Swallows regulation. Those
arguments emerge from additional considerations for
such entitlement mentioned in Barnhart. 171 Of those considerations, the following bear with particular force on
our situation.

·•

Fourth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the
importance of the question to administration of the
statute," one of the Barnhart factors. 172 Section 882(c)(2)
expressly conditions taking deductions on filing returns.
As shown in Part II.A, the courts have held that, in light
of that requirement, "it is inconceivable that Congress
contemplated ... that taxpayers could wait indefinitely
to file returns." 173 As shown in Part V.A below, the

Rogovin, "The Four R's; Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and
Retroactivity,"143 Taxes 756, 763 (1965); see United States v. Haggar

Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 388 (1999) (noting that the Chevron-

•

entitled regulation was intended "to bind the public" and "to
define legal relations between the Government and regulated
entities"); Sunstein, supra note 85, at 222 (force of law may exist
when an agency position binds private parties and perhaps the
agency itself).
167
See Saltzman, supra note 155, para. 3.02[2] (detailing the
steps); Mu:rphy, supra note 164, at 1017 (maintaining that those
facts demonstrate agency commitment to the position indicative
of force of law).
168
See section 6662(b)(l) ("disregard of tax.rules and regulations" can be a basis for imposition of the accuracy-related
penalty). But see ABA Deference Report, supra note 124, at
726-727 (questioning that position). Also, of course, violation of
the Swallows regulation subjects the taxpayer to the loss of
otherwise allowable deductions. See Thomas W. Merrill and
Kathryn Tongue Watts, "Agency Rules With the Force of Law;
The Original Convention," 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002) (arguing
that "force of law" was once defined by the imposition of
sanctions for violation, and exploring the desirability of restoring that convention).
169
E.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 28 (1983).
170E.g., Centun; Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 160
(8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); Community Bank
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 789, 791-792 (1982), affd, 819 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1987); McSltain v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 154, 162 (1977).
171
535 U.S. at 522; see text accompanying note 148 supra.

m535 U.S. at 222.
73
l Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703-704; see also Espinosa, 107
T.C. at 157.
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18-month rule in the regulation advances the congressional purpose of inducing foreign corporations to file
returns.
Fifth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the complexity of [the] administration [of the statute]," another
Barnhart factor. 17" The Swallows majority stated: "The
judiciary has enough expertise and experience to ascertain congressional intent with respect to Ithe word 'manner' in the statute]." 175 But there are more dimensions
that had to be considered than just that. Once the prior
cases, after considering "manner" and the rest of the
statute, had decided that section 882(c)(2) contemplates
some timing limitation, Treasury and the IRS had to
determine how to define that limitation - that is, where
to draw the line. In so doing, Treasury and the IRS had to
consider the importance of receiving. returns, the possibilities of obtaining information in other ways, the degree
of administrative burden in time and expense that pursuing other ways would entail, and what degrees of
burden foreign taxpayers would bear as a result of
different possibilities regarding where the line could be
drawn. Assessing and balancing those considerations
entailed complexity, required administrative expertise
(another Barnhart consideration), 176 and involved matters
of policy that are properly the province of agencies, not of
the courts.1 77
Sixth, Chevron entitlement is supported by "the interstitial nature of the legal question," another Barnhart
factor. 178 The Swallows majority expressed its view that
the regulation constituted "an unauthorized assumption
by the Secretary of major policy decisions properly made
by Congress: e.g., here, a foreign corporation's forfeiture
of deductions absent its filing of a timely tax return."17 9
Were the majority right in that, the regulation would be
invalid. The Supreme Court has taught that deference
does not extend as far as to allow an agency to make
fundamental decisions that properly are the responsibility of Congress. 180
However, the majority is wrong. Congress made the
decision that those deductions are forfeited if the foreign
corporation fails to file returns, and Congress wrote that
decision into section 882(c)(2). As shown in Part II.A, the
courts held that a timing limitation is implicit in Congress's decision. Thus, in promulgating the 18-month
rule, Treasury and the IRS were not making the "major
policy decision." They were only filling a gap necessary
to implement the decision Congress already had made.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the courts
should respect such interstitial administrative actions. "If
the administrator's reading fills a gap or defines a term in

174

See supra note 171.
175126 T.C. at 136.
176
See supra note 171.
177
E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-845; Redlark v. Commissioner,
141 F.3d 936, 939, Doc 98-12203. 98 TNT 71-3 (9th Cir. 1998).
178
See supra note 171.
179126 T.C. at 136; see•also id. at 147-148.
180
E.g., Whitman v. Anterican Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001); FDA v. Brozvn & Willianison Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120
(2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S.
218 (1994).
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a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's
revealed design, we give the administrator's judgment
'controlling weight.'''181
The Suiallows majority committed a related error. It
stated: "Congress is the only body that may amend the
relevant text. " 182 Similarly, in other cases, the Tax Court
has said that "the Secretary may not usurp the authority
of Congress by adding restrictions to a statute which are
not there." 183
Those statements are correct, but they apply to a
context different from Swallows. The Supreme Court
defined that context: When "the provisions of the act are
unambiguous, and its directions specific, there is no
power to amend it by regulation. " 184 However, "where
the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction, a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method
of its application to specific cases not only is permissible
but is to be given great weight by the courts." 185 Swallows
fits the latter category because the statute implies a
timing limitation but does not set the terms of that
limitation. In cases applying Chevron and upholding
challenged regulations, the Tax Court has held that:
to invoke these passages from our decisions for the
general proposition that regulations may not add
rules not found in the statute and not precluded by
the statute is to misread them. Indeed, supplementation of a statute is a necessary and proper part of
the Secretary's role in the administration of our tax
laws.186 i
In summary, the regulation at issue in Swallows passes
step zero for some of the same reasons that all or nearly
all general authority tax regulations should so pass: The
regulation went through the notice and comment process, it was approved at the highest relevant administrative level, and it probably has the force of law. Also, the
Swallows regulation is supported by considerations identified in Barnhart, specifically the importance of the
timing limitation to administration of the statute, the
complexity of the matters bearing on when to fix the
terminal date, and the interstitial nature of drawing the
timing line. Accordingly, the regulation is qualified to be
analyzed under Chevron.
V. Validity of the Regulation Under Chevron
If, as argued in Part rv, the validity of the Swallows
regulation is entitled to be analyzed under the Chevron
framework, the next task is to scrutinize the regulation

181
NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251,
257 (1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
132126 T.C. at 148 n.31.
183
Western Waste Inds. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 472, 476, Doc
95·3943, 95 TNT 73-7 (1995) (citing cases).
is-1Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936).
185
Id. at 446.
186
Hachette USA, Inc. v. Con1missioner, 105 T.C. 234, 251, Doc
95-8926, 95TNT188-30 (1995), affd, 87 F.3d 43, Doc 96·18801, 96
TNT 127-13 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Greenberg Bros. Partnership #4
v. Co1nmissioner, 111 T.C. 198, 206-207, Doc 98-26388, 98 TNT
164-12 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Cine111a '84 v. Co111missioner, 294 F.3d
432, Doc 2002-12370, 2002 TNT 187·17 (2d Cir. 2002).

under the two-step analysis. In my opinion, the regulation passes step-one scrutiny because section 882(c)(2)
does not unambiguously preclude an 18-month timing
limitation, and it passes step-two scrutiny because the
18-month limitation is within the range of reason.
A. Step One
Under step one, no deference is accorded to th€
agency's interpretation if "Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress
is clear, that is the end of the matter; [the court and the
agency] must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." 187 Justice Scalia noted a major question regarding step one: "How clear is clear? It is here, if
Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over
acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be
fought." 188 There has been little judicial consistency in
that regard. Different courts have treated step one with
different degrees of stringency. 189 In part, at least, those
outcomes may be unavoidable since "it may be
that ... the strict dichotomy between clarity and ambiguity is artificial, that what we have is a continuum, a
probability of meaning."190
While that history inspires caution as to any conclusions, I believe the regulation at issue in Swallows passes
step-one muster. Congress, in section 882(c)(2), did not
unambiguously express its intention to exclude an 18month timing rule. Even Anglo-American, the polestar for
the Swallows majority, acknowledged that as a linguistic
matter, the statutory term "manner" "is a comprehensive
term, and includes, but is more comprehensive than,
'method, mode, or way1 " ' and that in nontax cases,
"manner" has been construed sometimes to include and
sometimes not to refer to time.191
Although some judges have a penchant for using
dictionary definitions, 192 it is widely recognized that, for
step one, statutory meanings depend on context.193
Anglo-American concluded that, in the context of the

•
-l
!

187
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
188 Antonin Scalia, "Judicial Deference to Administrative

Interpretations of Law," 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520-521.
189
Prof. Seidenfeld has observed: "To the extent that Chevron
has generated dissension among lower courts, the dispute
primarily concerns the vigor with which judges inquire, at step
one, whether a statute has resolved the question addressed by
the agency." Seidenfeld, supra note 109, at 94-95; see also Note,
'"How Clear Is Clear' in Chevron's Step One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev.
1687, 1687, 1691-1692 (2005).
90
'
PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 797 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
191 38 BTA at 714.
192
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2221 &
2223 n.7 (2006) (plurality opinion); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern
Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874 (1999); National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992);
American Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1381 n.5, Doc
2001-22501, 2001 TNT 165·6 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See generally Ellen P.
Aprill, "The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court," 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 275 (1988).
193
£.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
133 (2000) ("the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme");
United States v. Riuerside Bayvieu1 Hmnes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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predecessor of section 882(c)(2), "manner" does not
include time, 19-± and the Swallows majority concluded
that, throughout the code, "Congress has consistently
used the word 'time' together with the word 'manner'
when it intended to include the meanings of both words
in a single taxing section." 195
Judge Holmes maintained that there are counterexamples in the code in which "manner" has been
understood to include a time element. 196 Be that as it may,
I wish to advance a more fundamental case. I believe the
regulation would survive step-one scrutiny even if the
Swallows majority, rather than judge Holmes, is correct as
to the word "manner." That's because statutory language, although obviously important, is not the sole
measure of "the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." Statutory purpose is important. In Swallows,
that purpose supports a timing limitation. Moreover, the
canons of statutory construction also are significant. In
Swallows, the canon in favor of interpreting statutes to
avoid absurd results supports a timing limitation.

1. Statutory purpose. Step one requires considering the
congressional purpose. In addition to considering the
"words of the statute ... read in context [and] the statute's place in the overall statutory scheme," the court
should consider "the problem Congress sought to solve"
in determining whether Congress's intent unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation. 197 The stepone inquiry ceases "if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent." 19 8 Indeed, "it is a well-established canon of
statutory construction that a court should go beyond the
literal language of a statute if reliance on that language
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute." 199
In assessing whether section 882(c)(2) unambiguously
precludes a timing rule, it is worth noting that the BTA,

(1985) (finding a statutory term inherently ambiguous despite
its seeming to be clear at the purely linguistic level); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 861.
9
i -±33 BTA at 715.
195
126 T.C. at 132.
196
ld. at 165.
"'Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006); PDK
Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Snowa
v. Commissioner, 123 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 1997); Nolle v.
Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1137-1138, Doc 93-8870, 93 TNT
172-12 (5th Cir. 1993).
198
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (emphasis
added) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Gorospe v.
Commissioner, 446 F.3d 1014, 1016, Doc 2006-8564, 2006 TNT
86-10 (9th Cir. 2006).
199
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see,
e.g., Brozvn v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 194 (1857); Prophit v.
Com1nissioner, 57 T.C. 507, 510-511 (1972), affd per curiam, 470
F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1973). In the frequently quoted language of
'Learned Hand, "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945).
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the Tax Court, and the Fourth Circuit all agreed that it
does not. As discussed in Part II, in Taylor Securities,
Ardbern, Blenheim, Georday, Espinosa, and InverWorld,
those courts held that the statute, far from prohibiting a
timing limitation, contemplates one. The reason for their
view is the purpose behind the statute.
Section 882(c)(2) expressly conditions availability of
deductions on the filing of a return. Congress imposed
that condition to provide a strong incentive for foreign
corporations to file returns 200 and to mitigate the formidable obstacles to effectively applying the federal income
tax to foreign corporations. 201 Anglo-A1nerican was concerned about the potentially harsh consequences of denying deductions. 202 Later cases observed that that was
precisely the point - the important administrative purpose of obtaining returns is furthered by the in terrore1n
effect of the deniaJ."n

In view of the statute's specifically requiring that
returns be filed, "it is inconceivable that Congress
contemplated ... that taxpayers could wait indefinitely
to file returns and [still be allowed to claim
deductions]." 204 By providing a bright-line demarcation
for when returns are too late, the regulation's 18-month
rule advances the reason Congress wrote section 882(c)(2)
into the code. 205

In a portion of its opinion potentially relevant to step
one,206 the Swallows majority said: "As to the 18-month
period set forth in the regulations, it is not only arbitrary
but without any statutory basis at all. . . . Where [the
rule] came from, we do not know." 207 That remark
ignores the Supreme Court's teaching in a delinquency
penalty tax case that "deadlines are inherently arbitrary;
fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish
necessary results." 208 Moreover, the majority fractures the
step-one inquiry. Step one asks whether the statute
unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation,
not whether the agency's interpretation can be traced to
some affirmative basis set out in the statute. That the
timing rule in the regulation advances the statutory
purpose is sufficient justification for it.
2. 0 Absurd results" canon. Chevron stated that, in considering whether "Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue," the court should "employ
traditional tools of statutory construction." 209 Those tools

200

E.g., Taylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703.
B/en'1eim, 125 F.2d at 909.
202
38 BTA at 715.
203
E.g., Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157.
20
-±raylor Securities, 40 BTA at 703-704.
205
See Johnson, supra note 6, Part IV.A.
206
Tue observation appears in a section entitled "Plain Meaning of the Relevant Text" 126 T.C. at 132-136. That section
follows on the heels of the majority's statement that the case
would come out the same under either Chevron or National
Muffler, id. at 131, and it p'recedes the majority's National Muffler
analysis .
267
Id. at 135 n.17.
208
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985).
lcN467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
201
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include the canons of construction. 210 That text - for tax
law - is not all-conquering and can be trumped by
canons is powerfully underlined by Coltec, an important
recent decision. 211 In that case, the IRS attacked a tax
shelter on statutory (sections 357 and 358) and economic
substance grounds. The Court of Federal Claims held for
the taxpayer in all respects, strongly endorsing textualism, if not literalism. 212 The Federal Circuit vacated the
decision. It agreed with the trial court that the taxpayer
had complied with the literal terms of the statutes, but it
held that the IRS could nonetheless prevail because of the
economic substance doctrine, saying, "The economic
substance doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction
that are employed in circumstances where the literal
terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate purpose of
the statute." 213

An absurd result would obtain were section 882(c)(2)
not backstopped by a timing limitation. Instead of filing
by a date certain, the foreign corporation could "wait and
see." Perhaps waiting to file the return until after the trial
court's decision becomes final would be too late because
of the rule of res judicata. 21 7 Short of that, however, great
delay and protraction would be possible. If section
882(c)(2) were interpreted to exclude any timing limitation, the foreign corporation could wait until contacted
by the IRS, still wait until the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency, and wait longer still until some time after it
filed a Tax Court petition challenging the notice of
deficiency. 218 If there is no time limit, the corporation
could still claim available deductions despite the delay.
To say that a statute, the purpose of which is to encourage
the filing of returns, permits that result would be absurd.

Particularly relevant in the Swallows context is the
canon that statutes should be construed so avoid producing absurd results. The absurdity canon is well established. "From the earliest days of the Republic, the
Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges
may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a
given application would otherwise produce 'absurd'
results. . . . Indeed, the absurdity doctrine has been one
of the few fixed points in the Court's frequently shifting
interpretive regimes." 214 The Court has applied the absurdity canon in many cases. 21 s Even textualist judges
generally agree that "interpretations of a statute which
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative
purpose are available." 216

The absurdity would be compounded if one considered the effect of that outcome on IRS enforcement of the
statute. The IRS's enforcement incentive would be considerably eroded if an audit, a deficiency notise, and the
Tax Court's pleadings could be undone by a subsequent
return.

2
wsee, e.g., Wisconsin Departinent of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 230 (1992) (stating that the "de minimis

non curnt lex" canon "is part of the established background of
legal principles against which all enactments are adopted");
Dole v. United Steelu1orkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (applying the
"noscitur n sociis" canon at step one).
211
Coltec Inds., Inc. v. United States, 2006-2 U.S.T.C. para.
50,389, Doc 2006-13276, 2006 TNT 134-10 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
vacating and remnnding 62 Fed. Cl. 716, Doc 2004-21316, 2004 TNT
214-16 (2004). For discussion of Coltec and other authorities, see
Lee A. Sheppard, "A More Intelligent Economic Substance
Doctrine," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 325.
212
As to differences between textualism and literalism, see
William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Poltiical Language and
the Political Process para. 5.04 (4th ed. 2005).
213
2006-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,100.
214
John E Manning, "The Absurdity Doctrine," 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 2387, 2388 (2003). See generally William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Stntutory
Interpretation 267-71 (2d ed. 2006); Popkin, supra note 212, at
31-33 and 254-59 (describing the golden rule of avoiding absurd
results).
215
E.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 454 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
509-510 (1989); Un1ted States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948);
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-487 (1868); see also Public
Cit. v. Unzted States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-471 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
216
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., writing for the Court); see Manning, supra note
214, at 2388.

788

A parallel exists for adjustment clauses under the gift
tax. Under those clauses, the amount of noncash property
transferred from the donor to the donee is adjusted
downward (to an amount within the annual exclusion
limit) if the IRS audits and determines that the value of
the property exceeds the annual exclusion under section
2503(b ). If those clauses were effective, the IRS' s incentive
to audit woµld be greatly reduced since the result of the
audit would be that there was no deficiency. For that
reason, the IRS takes the position that the clauses are
invalid as contrary to public policy, 219 and the courts
have upheld that position. 220 That parallel emphasizes
the absurdity of allowing IRS enforcement against delinquent foreign corporations to be undercut by a largely
open-ended filing regime.

•

•

3. Summary. The statutory term "manner" is linguistically ambiguous, and its meaning under the code is
arguable. In any event, a timing limitation is implicit in
the statutory purpose, and excluding that limitation
would produce absurd results. If the validity of some
timing rule is accepted, the 18-month rule is not unambiguously precluded by the statute because section
882(c)(2) does not set or bar any specific time period.
Accordingly, the regulation at issue in Swallows passes
scrutiny under step one of Chevron.

217

See section 7481 (finality of Tax Court decisions).
b'The Tax Court petition would not have to allege that the
return had been filed. It could be amended later to claim the
deductions after the return had been filed. The opportunity to
amend a pleading is not infinite. However, "leave [to amend a
pleading] shall be given freely when justice so requires." Tax Ct.
R. 41(a).
219
E.g., Rev. Rul. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300.
220
E.g., Co111n1issio11er v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824, 827-828 (4th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944); Ward v. Co111111issioner, 87
T.C. 78. 110-114 (1986).
21
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VI. Validity of the Regulation Under Brand X
Brand X is a major administrative law decision. 22s

B. Step Two

If an agency position survives step one, it often is
thought, it is highly likely to be found reasonable at step
two. 221 Nonetheless, it would be unwise for an agency to
take step two lightly. Some prominent cases have been
resolved adversely to agencies at step two. 222
Although the step-two inquiry can sometimes be
challenging, I do not believe that it is in mutated Swallows. The regulation at issue easily passes muster as
reasonable. We have assumed that the prior cases established a "date of SFR" termination. But that date, while it
may fall within the range of reason, does not define the
boundaries of that range. An important teaching of
Chevron regarding step two is that "the court need not
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."223

At least in part, "the 'reasonableness' of an agency's
construction depends on the construction's 'fit' with the
statutory language as well as its conformity to statutory
purposes." 2 24 The regulation's 18-month rule and the
assumed case law rule regarding the date of SFR are

indistinguishable in terms of their fit with the language
of section 882(c)(2). The regulation's rule is superior to

Because it's so recent, however, important questions
raised by the case remain to be answered. TI1is section

considers Brand X, first generally, then in the mutated
Swallows context. I believe that, under Bmnd X, the
regulation at issue in Swallows should control over the
assumed contrary rule emanating from the prior case law.

A. Brand X
Before Chevron, an interpretation of a statute by the
Supreme Court generally was binding on agencies under
the rule of stare decisis.'2 29 As many commentators have
noted, Chevron created a tension between its rule of
deference and the doctrine of stare decisis. 2 30 The tensions
between administrative flexibility on one hand, and

stability, reliance, and legitimacy on the other hand,
generated significant commentary in both administrative
law 231 and tax law 232 even before the Brand X decision
was handed down.
Initially, stare decisis appeared ascendant under a trilogy of 1990s Supreme Court cases. 2 " The contours of the
rule were controversial, however. "Although the Supreme Court ... concluded that its ou111 precedents trump
Chevron, it ... frequently upheld agency interpretations ... at odds with existing lower court precedent." 23"

the case law's rule in conformity to the purpose behind

•

section 882(c)(2). The regulation provides the more definitive rule. A time certain has a greater in terrorem effect
than does an event (the SFR) that may come soon, late, or
not at all. 225 It is possible that, in some cases, the IRS

could prepare an SFR in less than 18 months from the
return due date, in which case the regulation would
provide a longer period than the assumed case law
rule. 226 In far more cases, 18 months will be shorter than
the assumed case law period. That too will further the

statutory purpose by encouraging more prompt compliance. 227

•

221
See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d
973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department ofTransp., 84~ F.2d 1444, 1453
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Seidenfeld, supra note 109, at 96; "Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of
Standing and Deference to the Agency," 4 Adniin. L.J. 113, 124
(comments of Judge Stephen Williams).
222
E.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Abbott
Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
819 (1991).
223
467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
"'Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
225
See Johnson, supra note 6, Part IV.A.
226
126 T.C. at 162 (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("The 18-month
, grace period might be shorter or longer than the old judicially
construed one. It is undeniably more definite.") (footnote omitted).
227
Nor can it be said that this would be accomplished at the
price of an unreasonable burden on taxpayers. An 18-month
grace period hardly is excessively onerous. See Johnson, supra
note 6, Part IV.B.

228
See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down:
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference," 58 Ad111i11. L.
Rev. 429, 431 (2006). Other commentary on Brand X includes
Kathryn A. Watts, "Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie
Doctrine," 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2007); Note,
"Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?"
119 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (2006).
'
229
See Polsky, supra note 124, at 199-209.
230
E.g., Paul A. Dame, "Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skidmore; Do Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule
Courts?," 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 405 (2002); Richard W. Murphy.
A 'New' Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference
and Agency Interpretive Freedom," 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2004);
Timothy Zick, "Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and
the Power to 'Say What the Law Is,"' 59 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 839,
841-842 (2002).
231
Id. See also, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, "Provisional
Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking," 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1272 (2002); David H.E. Becker, "judicial
Review of INS Adjudication: When May the Agency Make
Sudden Changes in Policy and Apply Its Decision Retroactively?" 52 Admin. L. Rev. 219 (2000); David M. Gossett, "Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of
Statutes," 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1997).
232
See Polsky, supra note 124. For further discussion, see
Littriello v. United States, 2005WL1173277, Doc 2005-12029, 2005
TNT 106-20 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (on appeal to the Sixth Circuit);
Brant J. Hellwig and Gregg D. Polsky, "The Employment Tax
Challenge to the Check-the-Box Regulations," Tax Notes, May
29, 2006, p. 1039.
233
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996); Ledt111ere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-537 (1992); Mais/in Indus., ll.S., Inc. u.
Primary Steel. Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-131 (1990).
23
-±Polsky, supra note 124, at 201 n.94 (emphasis in original)
(citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 477, 482 (1999)).
Although not a Chevron case, the Court in United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274 (2002), upheld the IRS's view as to the reach of the
11

11

(Footnote continued on next page.)

, TAX NOTES, August 28, 2006

789

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

Circuit courts disagreed whether their own precedents
precluded contrary agency interpretations. 23 5
And as always, context matters. The "deference versus
precedent" question could arise in any of three postures:
"where a court interpreted a sta tute before Chevron was
decided; where a court interpreted a statute after Chevron
and deferred to the agency; and where a court interpreted
a statute after Chevron and, for one reason or another,
refused to defer to the agency's interpretation." 236 PreBrand X commentators argued that precedent should
control in the third situation237 but not in the first 238 or
second. 239
Brand X dramatically altered the landscape. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, subjects to mandatory common-carrier regulation all those who provide
"telecommunication services." 2-t-0 In 2002 the FCC issued
a ruling that cable companies selling broadband Internet
service are not providing telecommunications services
and so are exempt from that regulation.
Numerous parties petitioned for judicial review of the
ruling. By judicial lottery, the Ninth Circuit was selected
as the venue for the challenge. In relevant part, the Ninth
Orcuit vacated the FCC's ruling as an impermissible
construction of the statute. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit
chose not to apply Chevron but instead based its decision
on stare decisis. 241 In the previous case, AT&T Corp. v. City
of Portland"' - which had not involved the FCC as a
party and had been decided several years before the FCC
issued the challenged ruling - the Ninth Circuit reached
a holding contrary to the conclusion in the ruling. In
Brand X, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the Supreme
Court's Neal decision,2-B AT&T overrode the FCC's contrary ruling.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that
Chevron provided the appropriate standard of review.
Congress made a delegation to the FCC similar to the
delegation made to the Treasury under section 7805(a). 244
That delegation gave the FCC "the authority to promulgate binding legal rules; the Commission issued the order
1

federal tax lien under section 6321 despite the fact that generations of nearly unanimous 10V1'er court cases were to the
contrary.
235
Co1npare EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 60 F.3d
1225, 1229-1230 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S.
202 (1997), with Satellite Broad. & Con1mun. Ass'n v. Oman, 17 F.3d
344, 348 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 823 (1994).
236
Gossett, supra note 231, at 692 n.53.
2371d.

under revie"'A' in the exercise of that authority; and no one
questions that the order is within the Commission's
jurisdiction .... Hence, as we have in the past, we apply
the Chevron framework. "'.!--J.5
Those challenging the FCC's ruling disputed the applicability of Chevron on the grounds that the ruling is
inconsistent with the FCC' s past practice. The Court said;
"We reject this argument. Agency inconsistency is not a
basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation
under the Chevron framework." 246
The Court then laid down the rule that matters for
mutated Swallows, providing that prior judicial construction "trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled
to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion." 247 The Court distinguished Neal, 248 and it
supported its new rule in three ways. First, the Court
stated that "this principle follows from Chevron itself."
Specifically, "allowing a judicial precedent to foreclose an
agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute ... would
allow a court's interpretation to override an agency's.
Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to
fill statutory gaps."'49
Second, the Court offered two policy arguments. One
was that the Ninth Circuit's position "would 'lead to the
ossification of large parts of our statutory law."' 250 The
other was the following anomaly. The Ninth Circuit's
position:
would mean that whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron
deference would turn on the order in which the
interpretations issue: If the court's construction
came first, its construction would prevail, whereas
if the agency's came first, the agency's construction
would command Chevron deference. Yet whether
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority
to interpret a statute does not depend on the order
in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur. 251

•

•

Third, the Court responded to an objection raised by
Justice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia accused the majority
of "inventing yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial
decisions subject to reversal by Executive officers." 252 The
Brand X majority disagreed.
Since Chevron teaches that a court's opinion as to
the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency
is charged with administering is not authoritative,

238

Jahan Sharifi, "Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal Agencies After the Chevron Decision: What
Gives?" 60 U. Chi. U.L. Re-o. 223, 229, 244-247 (1993).
239
Rebecca Hanner White, "The Stare Decisis 'Exception' to
the Chevron Deference Rule," 44 Fla. L. Rev. 723, 726-728 (1992).
2
'°47 U.S.C. section 153(44).
°"345 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003), rev°d, 125 S. Ct. 2688
(2005).
2
216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).

°"

2 3
-'

Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
--J.--J.The FCC was given the power to "execute and enforce"
the Communications Act and to "prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
out the provisions" of the act. 47 U.S.C. sections 151 and 201(b).
2
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5
" 125
246Jd.
247

S. Ct. at 2699.

at 2700.
Id. at 2701. The Court did acknowledge: "There is genuine
confusion in the lower courts over the interaction betvveen the
Chevron doctrine and stare decisis principles." Id. at 2702.
249
Id. at 2700.
250
Id. at 2700-2701 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, j .,
dissenting)).
251
125 S. Ct. at 2700.
252
1d. at 2719.
1d.

2 8
--J.
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the agency's decision to construe that statute differently from a court does not say that the court's
holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency
may ... choose a different construction, since the
agency remains the authoritative interpreter
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In all
other respects, the court's prior ruling remains
binding law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable). 253
Having established its rule, the Brand X Court applied
it. The Court held that the AT&T case did not say its
result was compelled by an unambiguous statute. That
case "held only that [its construction was] the best
reading ... not that it was the only permissible reading of
the statute." 254 That being so, and because the FCC's
position survived scrutiny under both step one and step
two of Chevron,2 55 the FCC's interpretation prevailed over
the prior contrary Ninth Circuit decision.
Major decisions often raise at least as many questions
as they answer, and that surely is true of Brand X. The
following are among the questions that may be addressed by future cases:

• Does "unambiguous" mean the same thing for
Brand X purposes as it does under Chevron step one?
"If so, ... every case that reaches Step Two of Chevron will be agency-reversible" under Brand X.256

•

• Will the court's decision regarding ambiguity be
conclusive? For example, can the agency, in the later
case in which it is defending its interpretation,
argue, "Yes, the earlier court said its ,interpretation
was based on an unambiguous statute, but that
conclusion is wrong"?

• Will the later court have to decide whether the
assertion of unambiguity was dictum or holding?2s7
• "Does the 'unambiguous' dictum produce stare decisis effect even when a court is affirming, rather than
reversing, agency action - so that in the future the
agency must adhere to that affirmed interpretation?"2ss
• "If so, does the victorious agency have the right to
appeal a Court of Appeals judgment in its favor, on
the ground that the text in question is in fact not (as
the Court of Appeals held) unambiguous, so the
agency should be able to change its view in the
future?" 259

B. Brand X Applied to the Swallows Regulation
Few of the implementation questions sketched above
are present in mutated Swallows. There is a straightforward Brand X case for permitting the regulation at
issue to trump the assumed time of SFR terminal date
under the prior cases. As shown in Parts IV and V, the
regulation is entitled to Chevron deference. And, as
shown below, the prior cases did not hold that the time of
SFR terminal date follows from the unambiguous terms
of section 882(c)(2).
One interesting question could arise were Chevron
held inapplicable to the regulation at issue in Swallows.
Could the government claim the benefit of Brand X
anyway? The Tax Court said in both Swallows and
elsewhere that Chevron merely restated National Muffler
with a few "possibly subtle distinctions." 260 If the two
tests are essentially equivalent, and if, as I argue in the
first report,261 the 1990 regulation would be entitled to
deference under National Muffler, it could be argued that
Brand X still should apply. Meeting Chevron in substance
(via equivalency), even if not in name, should suffice to
satisfy the precondition of the Brand X rule. Of course, we
need not go down this road if, as I believe, the regulation
is Chevron-entitled.
The Swallows majority's responses to Brand X are
unconvincing. The majority first offered: "Given that the
Supreme Court has historically reviewed Federal tax
regulations primarily under the reasonableness test of
Natl. Muffler . .. , the question arises whether [Brand X],
which neither cited Natl. Muffler nor involved a Federal
tax regulation, applies to Federal tax regulations." 262 That
doesn't go very far. As described in Part IVA, the
Supreme Court's application of Chevron in' tax cases has
been unexplained and haphazard. However, if Chevron
does apply, then Brand X would as well. Brand X is an
elaboration of Chevron. To say that Chevron applies but
Brand X does not would be to sunder the inseparable.
The Swallows majority next advanced four grounds on
which it thought Brand X to be distinguishable. First, the
FCC had carefully considered the issue, but "here we find
no corresponding record . . . the Secretary's rationale for
adopting the disputed regulations is at best perfunctory."263 Second, the FCC's ruling was consistent with
prior FCC rulings, but the 1990 regulation "directly
altered regulations adopted in (and unchanged since)
1957." 2 Third, the FCC had not been a party to the
AT&T case, but "here, the Commissioner was the unsuccessful party in all the [prior] cases." 265 Fourth, AT&T

°'

•

253Jd. at 2701. The Court added: "The precedent has not been
'reversed' by the agency, any more than a federal court's
interpretation of a State's law can be said to have been 'reversed'
by the state court that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative)
interpretation of state law." Id.
'"'Id. at 2701.
255
See id. at 2704-2710.
256Jd. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
.
257 Note, supra note 228, at 1538. Justice Scalia said that such
assertions would "presumably [beJ in dictum." 125 S. Ct. at
2720.

258 125 S. Ct. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259Jd.
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260 126 T.C. at 131 (quoting Central Pa. Sav. Ass'n v. Commis-

sioner, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995)).

261 Johnson, supra note 6, Part VI.
262
126 T.C. at 143-144.
263
Id. at 144.
264Id.

265 Id. The Swallozus majority persists in its curious habit of
calling the IRS "the unsuccessful party" in the previous cases
despite the fact that the IRS won most of them.
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preceded Brand X by only about five years, while AngloAmerican preceded the 1990 regulation by about 50
years.266
judge Holmes said: "These distinctions should not
make a difference - the Suprem~ Court did not balance
carefulness of consideration, prior litigation history, or
the amount of time that had passed between the case Jaw
and the new regulation. It simply looked to see if the
agency had been delegated broad regulatory authority
and whether its construction of an ambiguous statutory
phrase was reasonable." 267
judge Holmes's point is right, but it may not afford
enough security. As shown in Part IV.A, Chevron was
"refined" in sometimes surprising ways by subsequent
cases. The same fate might befall Brand X. If the abovedescribed implementation questions prove difficult, or if
some justices change their minds or are succeeded by
differently minded jurists, Brand X could be subject to a
process of common law revision. Thus, we should consider not just whether the proffered distinctions appeared
in Brand X but also whether they should.
I think they should not. Most of the four grounds
mentioned above are addressed to the wrong level. If
they have any validity, they should be taken into account
when deciding whether the agency's interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference in the first place. If that
deference attaches, the grounds should play no further
role. They do not provide reasons to sever Brand X
preference lrom Chevron eligibility. Further, individually,
each one of the four grounds offered by the majority lacks
merit, as shown below.
Care in consideration: The Swallows majority understated the degree of consideration the IRS and Treasury
gave to the terminal date. The Treasury decision accompanying the finalized regulation shows that Treasury
made several changes to the proposed regulation based
on consideration of comments received. 268 It also makes
clear that the IRS specifically considered objections to a
terminal date but rejected them for both statutory and
administrability reasons. 269 Moreover, the IRS' s position
incubated during the decades of litigation of the issue,
and the explanations the IRS gave should be read in
conjunction with the explanations given by the prior
cases as to the necessity of a terminal date in the statutory
scheme.270
Agency consistency: The 1957 regulation did not say
that there is no terminal date; it simply was silent on the
subject. Throughout the prior cases, the IRS argued for a
terminal date (although not the 18-month date). The IRS
litigated and won Espinosa and InverWorld after the 1957
regulation was promulgated. Therefore, the suggestion of
IRS inconsistency can be overplayed.
There is also a more fundamental problem. In Brand X,
the FCC's opponents accused the FCC of inconsistency.
As quoted in Part VI.A, the principal reason the Court
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Id. at 145.
/d. at 171-172 (Holmes,)., dissenting).

See T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172-173.
269Jd. at 172.
270See Part II.A supra.
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rejected that argument was not that the FCC had been
consistent but that agencies are permitted to change their
mind. 271 That view should remain part of Brand X even if
reconstructed since that view is solidly rooted in Chevron
itself.272

•

IRS a party in prior cases: Reinterpreting Brand X in this
way would seriously undermine the teaching of that,
case. The Swallows situation (in which the agency was a
party to the prior case or cases) is much more common
than the AT&T situation (in which the agency was not a
party). Confining Brand X to situations in which the
agency had not been a party in the prior case would
make Brand X an aspect of collateral estoppel-type reasoning273 rather than a concomitant of Chevron. That is
not what Brand X contemplated. The Brand X majority
noted that the FCC had not been a party in AT&T, but it
gave no indication that its rule was confined to those
situations. Justice Scalia said in dissent that he had made
no "calculatio;,_ of how many hundreds of past statutory
decisions" would be affected by Brand X, but that he
suspected the number was very large. 274 That prediction
shows that, like the majority, the dissenters did not
understand Brand X to apply only when the agency had
been a party in the prior litigation.
Tilne between prior cases and agency interpretation: Why
would that matter? Conceivably, a Jong-settled rule could
engender a reliance interest, but no reasonable reliance
could exist in the Swallows situation. The .IRS continued
to litigate - and win - the issue over the decades, and
the 1990 regulation was proposed and finalized years
before the tax years at issue in Swallows. 275 The Swallows
majority linked the time gap to the legislative reenactment doctrine. 276 However, as shown in my first report,
that doctrine is of dubious applicability to Swallows and,
if it applies, supports rather than undercuts the validity
of the 1990 regulation. 277

•

There is another problem with the Swallows majority's
argument. Were it accepted that too Jong a gap is
problematic, the courts would be enmeshed in linedrawing exercises. How long is too long? Courts probably would be reluctant to set a fixed time (as the prior
cases were reluctant to settle on a fixed terminal date),
and exploring the facts and circumstances of each case
would waste judicial resources. Those exercises are best
avoided by declining the invitation of the Swallows
majority to amend Brand X to include a "time gap" factor.

271
125 S. Ct. at 2699.
272 "An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone. On the contrary, the agency ... must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864. Indeed, the EPA position
that the Court upheld in Chevron was a change from the
agency's previous position.
273 See, e.g., Meier v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 273, 282~283 (1988)
(discussing evolution of the doctrine of mutuality in collateral
estoppel).
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><125 S. Ct. at 2721.
275Johnson, supra note 6, Part \ 7.B.l.
276 126 T.C. at 145.
277Johnson, supra note 6, Part V.B.1.
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In the du Pont case, the Third Circuit stated:" Although
there may be situations in which substantial and prejudicial delay in exercising rule-making authority might
alter the degree of deference accorded a regulation, we
see no express prejudice here nor do we discern any other
factors that would change the nature of our review."278
The same situation exists in Swallows.
In the event of failure of its distinctions, the Swallows
majority had a last line of defense. Although it conceded
that the prior cases "did not state explicitly that they
were applying the unambiguous meaning of the word
'manner' [in section 882(c)(2)]," the majority said that
"we believe that they did so."279
I believe that argument is indefensible. As shown in
Part II, if the prior cases held anything unambiguously, it
was that section 882(c)(2) contemplates some terminal
date. Those cases hinted at many possible terminal dates
or events but settled on none of them. We have assumed,
for mutated Swallows purposes, that the prior cases stood
for a time of SFR terminal date. However, neither collectively nor individually did the prior cases hold that the
time of SFR terminal date is unambiguously commanded
by section 882(c)(2). Indeed, they couldn't. Nothing in the
statutory language or purpose points to the date of SFR
any more clearly than it points to 18 months.
C. Summary
Under Brand X, conflict between the regulation and
the assumed case law rule should be resolved in favor of
the regulation. The regulation is Chevron-entitled, and the
prior cases did not declare - nor on section 882(c)(2) as
it exists could they have declared - tl)at their rule
followed unambiguously from the statute and so precluded administrative discretion. The arguments offered

278
£.I. du Pont de Ne1nours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130,
135 (3d Cir. 1994).
279
126 T.C. at 145.

by the Srvallorvs majority against Brand X are contrary to
Brand X as it stands and should not be engrafted onto
Brand X if the rule of that case is revised in the future.

VII. Conclusion
My previous report examined Swallozvs as it is. The
prior cases taught that some timing limitation is implicit
in section 882(c)(2), but neither the statute nor the cases
defined that limitation. Filling statutory gaps is a role for
Treasury and the IRS, and the 18-month rule in the
regulation is reasonable. If National Muffler provides the
appropriate standard, the regulation easily passes muster
under it.
This second report examined mutated Swallows, assuming that the prior cases established a date of SFR
timing limitation inconsistent with the 18-month rule in
the regulation. Even on that assumption, the regulation
should be upheld. The regulation is Chevron-entitled at
step zero, and it passes scrutiny at both step one and step
two. Because the regulation qualifies for Chevron deference, the Brand X precondition is satisfied. Moreover, the
prior cases neither said - nor, on section 8829(c)(2) as it
exists, could they have said - that the date of SFR rule is
unambiguously commanded by the statute, leaving Treasury and the IRS no discretion to promulgate the 18month rule. Accordingly, under Brand X, any conflict
between the regulation and the prior cases should be
resolved in favor of the regulation.
In short, the regulation should be upheld regardless of
whether National Muffler or Chevron provides the governing standard. The Third Circuit should reverse Swallows.
Whatever the outcome of Swallows, however, the issues
discussed in this report will eventually be encountered in
other tax cases. When regulations contravtfne prior case
law, we will have to grapple with the significance of
Brand X in tax. In turn, to the extent that Brand X depends
on Chevron, that will compel us to rethink the roles of
Chevron and the National Muffler line of cases .
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